SELLING HEALTH DATA: DE-IDENTIFICATION, PRIVACY, AND SPEECH

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Abstract

Two court cases that involve selling prescription data for pharmaceutical marketing affect biomedical informatics, patient and clinician privacy, and regulation. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. et al. in the US and R v. Department of Health, Ex Parte Source Informatics Ltd in the UK concern privacy and health data protection, data de-identification and re-identification, drug detailing (marketing), commercial benefit from required disclosure of personal information, clinician privacy and duty of confidentiality, beneficial and unsavory uses of health data, regulating health technologies, and considering data as speech. Individuals should, at the very least, be aware of how data about them is collected and used. Taking account of how that data is used is needed so societal norms and law evolve ethically as new technologies affect health data privacy and protection.

Introduction

Widespread use of electronic patient record systems enables opportunities to improve health care through data sharing, secondary use, and big data analytics, but also creates more opportunities for privacy violations, data breaches, and inappropriate uses. A 2011 US Supreme Court case concerning selling prescription data for pharmaceutical marketing, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., et al., provides an occasion for examining issues related to privacy and protection of health data. Although the legalities involve unique features of US constitutional law related to free speech, a similar case in the United Kingdom in 2000, R v. Department of Health, Ex Parte Source Informatics Ltd., points to the international nature of these issues. In that case, Source Informatics, which
operates as a subsidiary of IMS Health Inc. in the UK, wanted to sell pharmaceutical companies information on general practitioners’ prescribing habits.

According to their web site, “IMS Health is the world’s leading information, services and technology company dedicated to making healthcare perform better.” Operating in over 100 countries, they process over 45 billion healthcare transactions annually, information from 100,000 suppliers, for over 5,000 healthcare clients globally. Throughout the 1980s, IMS Health developed online services to report on pharmaceutical sales and purchased or collaborated with companies engaged in related activities. By 1989, they were providing “laptop-based sales management service tools for pharmaceutical sales representatives in the US and Europe.” That IMS Health, Inc. was joined in the US case by SDI, Source Healthcare Analytics (a subsidiary of Wolters Kluwer Pharma Solutions), and the Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers Association makes it even more obvious that aggregating and selling prescription and other health data is an international enterprise. Thus, the Sorrell and Source cases raise more general global concerns, including: appropriate use and secondary use of data for data mining, marketing, research, public health, and health care; data ownership; and patient and clinician data and privacy protection. Their consequences may affect biomedical informatics, patient and clinician privacy, and regulation in ways this paper explores, both in the US and elsewhere.

Throughout the paper, I focus primarily on Sorrell. I bring in the Source case, calling into question whether de-identification, on which US and European privacy regulation rests, is sufficient for these purposes. After introducing Sorrell and the US legal environment, I turn to ethical analysis, focusing first on problems of de-
identification and then on particularities of prescription data. I discuss drug detailing (marketing), commercial benefit from required disclosure of personal information, clinician privacy and duty of confidentiality, beneficial and unsavory uses of health data, regulating health technologies, and considering data as speech. Elsewhere I discuss additional ethical issues related to selling health data. Throughout, I take the stance that individuals should, at the very least, be aware of how data about them is collected and used, and that how that data is used is crucial.

The UK Source Case

The Source case permitted pharmacy data to be sold without patient permission because it was “anonymized,” i.e., specified identifying information was removed, what in the US is called “de-identification.” Such disclosure was deemed not to be unfair to or to disadvantage the patient, and therefore, was not judged a breach of confidentiality by the pharmacist. The UK’s Court of Appeal based this opinion on a Federal Court of Australia decision, declaring that patient privacy was safeguarded because patient personal identities are concealed. It found that “a reasonable pharmacist’s” conscience would not be troubled by this use of a patient’s prescription, so confidentiality would not be breached. Thus, the case was decided on privacy grounds, and depended upon whether selling de-identified prescription data meant pharmacists violated their duty of confidentiality. The Court of Appeal held that processing anonymized data is not within the scope of the European Union Data Protection Directive and the UK Data Protection Act of 1998 based on it. This meant that pharmacists could disclose anonymized patient data for whatever purpose they wished.
Some interpreted the decision to suggest that whether releasing patient data without consent was a breach of confidentiality depended on context and raised questions about the scope and basis of the duty of confidentiality. In this reading, the decision ignored not only some of the provisions of the EU Data Protection Directive (and, indeed, the European Court of Human Rights, in a later case, took a more expansive view of privacy), but also the distress that could be caused by releasing even anonymized personal data. It also undermined patients’ expectations of privacy.

The US Sorrell v. IMS Case

The US Sorrell case was different from UK Source case in that it was argued and decided as a speech case. Nevertheless, it often is understood as pitting privacy protection against free speech, and resolving the apparent conflict in favor of free speech. There was scant attention to pharmacists’ duty of confidentiality. Despite the US legalities, like Source, the case brings out significant issues of values and rights related to personal health data. As the ability of both government and private organizations to collect and aggregate individually identified personal data has grown, data as speech v. privacy has become the focus of much legal debate that illuminates privacy and policy considerations relevant everywhere.

In the US, health data collected for clinical care is governed by The US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (discussed below), while free speech case law is based on the First Amendment to the US Constitution. Though particular to the US, examining this legal background is helpful for thinking through the issues involved, especially as US law shares characteristics with international legal tools and also because what happens in the US affects markets and services worldwide.
In *Sorrell*, the US Supreme Court struck down a Vermont law that restricted selling prescriber prescription data to use for marketing prescription drugs without prescriber consent. The challengers of the Vermont law, IMS Health, other data aggregators, and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, argued the case on free speech grounds. William H. Sorrell, in his role as the attorney general of the state of Vermont, defended the law on the grounds that restrictions on direct-to-physician pharmaceutical marketing ("detailing") were justified to (1) "protect medical privacy, including physician confidentiality, avoidance of harassment, and the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship" and (2) to achieve its [Vermont’s] policy objectives of "improved public health and reduced healthcare costs" by reducing "overprescription of new drugs [and] controlling costs by stemming practices that promote expensive, branded drugs over generics." Vermont’s announced intention to tip the marketplace of ideas against drug companies was the "fatal self-inflicted wound" for free speech. The Court, in a 6-3 decision, rejected Vermont's position and struck down the law.

The US is unusual in its tradition of constitutional protection of speech. The First Amendment to the US Constitution—"Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech..."—has come to cover a wide range of expression. Different categories of speech, related to its purpose and value, have developed and are protected differently. Generally, common business practices and expression that is part of economic activity, such as marketing, advertising, and contracts, have not been protected as speech, or, when they have been protected, they are protected differently from, for example, political speech or artistic expression.
"Commercial speech," such as advertising, is regulated according to criteria in a 1980 Supreme Court decision Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation vs. Public Service Commission of NY case. In Sorrell, the Court did not apply the commercial speech standards of Central Hudson to strike down the Vermont statute. Instead, the majority opinion applied the heightened judicial scrutiny standard governing individual speech, declaring that “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”

The Sorrell decision is ambiguous and can be considered a retreat from previous US commercial speech doctrine, a defense of not singling out speech that is disfavored, or a judgment that all data is “speech” and so any data regulation is subject to US constitutional protection. The data is speech argument has trumped privacy in US courts, where data traditionally has been considered speech.

The Sorrell case received considerable attention because the decision involves constitutional issues of speech and privacy. Ironically, the Court largely avoided issues of privacy. The First Amendment implicitly protects aspects of privacy in the form of freedom of thought, intellect, and association, and, in the famous defining words of Justice Louis Brandeis, citing Judge Cooley, “the right to be let alone” but generally not privacy claims related to disclosing highly sensitive truthful personal information. But the Sorrell case also concerns public health, health care, and regulatory policy as it relates to preserving both free speech and privacy – and health care data privacy.

**Data De-Identification and Privacy**

Both the Source and Sorrell cases assume de-identification serves to protect privacy. Indeed, the foundation of much privacy regulation is that if there is no personally identifiable information, there is no privacy harm. Making de-identification
central to privacy raises significant ethical and legal concerns. Relying on de-
identification assumes that patients mainly are concerned not to have their names
attached to data about them. However, this is not always how they see it. Henrietta
Lack’s family was upset because her name was not attached to her cell line.25 Individuals
may object to using their personal data, de-identified or not, in research which they
consider repugnant, for example for contraception research, animal research, embryonic
research, or genetic research. Patients who think it wrong that they themselves have no
commercial interest in data about themselves, but that others do, may be distressed by
practices they consider unethical by data aggregators, pharmaceutical companies, or
individuals who sell patient data, and so not wish to contribute to their profits.26 Also at
issue is who determines if data is identifiable. Whether an official, such as a data
controller in the EU, can identify an individual is not the same as whether a marketer,
newspaper reporter, a neighbor, or other party could.27 Pharmacists’, physicians’,
nurses’, or patients’ experiences of breaches of confidentiality is, to them, a violation
regardless of what courts decide.

The conviction that de-identification results in anonymization that protects
individual privacy also is problematic. It rests on the assumption that it is possible to
create a static set of criteria that “identifies” an individual, regardless of context,
individual preference, changes over time, or what else may be known or revealed about
the person. As the information kept in medical records grows to include patients’
genomes and other genetic information as well as data on social and behavioral
determinants of health (such as smoking status, employment, gender orientation,
education level, ethnicity, living conditions),28 it will be easier to identify patients from
their records. Further, as data collection proliferates in all walks of life, technological
developments and the computer science specialty of re-identification science are creating
techniques to combine previously separate databases.\textsuperscript{29} Despite considerable research
also underway to combine patient information while protecting patient privacy,\textsuperscript{30}
currently de-identification is insufficient,\textsuperscript{31, 32, 33} making the basis for decisions that data
can be anonymized, as the UK’s Court of Appeal in \textit{Source}, suspect.

These considerations pertain to all health data privacy protection depending on
de-identification. The ability to combine databases makes re-identification easier, even if
some of the databases contain only de-identified records. Relying on de-identification
contributes to what has been called inadequate problematic legal frameworks for data
protection via the European Data Protection Directive and UK law. Addressing the
concerns “would require a significant shift in approach towards data-protection across
Europe.”\textsuperscript{34} Similar deficiencies afflict US law,\textsuperscript{35} where agencies as influential as the
Institute of Medicine recognize that “the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not protect privacy as
well as it should, and that, as currently implemented, it impedes health research.”\textsuperscript{36}
Moreover, privacy protection depends not merely on de-identification, or even
anonymization, but also on expectations, transparency, and how data is used.

HIPAA, however, does not apply to the \textit{Sorrell} case. The reasons, discussed next,
highlight further need to revisit this sort of legislation, in the US and elsewhere.

\textbf{US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)}

Both US law and EU data protection policies make special note of health
information. The European Union takes a comprehensive general approach to privacy,
reflected in the 1995 Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data.\textsuperscript{37, 38}
Unlike in European countries where the EU Data Protection Directive takes an expansive view of privacy, in the US, there is no omnibus privacy law. Privacy protection is more limited and is governed differently in different sectors, resulting in what Europeans consider a “reluctance to protect patient medical data from misuse.” As new technological developments make widespread data collection and aggregation possible, increasing both the possibility and harms of disclosing sensitive data, US laws develop to address privacy. Health data is subject to myriad, possibly conflicting, and often confusing privacy protections that data about, for example, grocery purchases, is not. The common law tort system and more recent US legislation reflect citizens’ concerns of vulnerability, stigmatization, embarrassment, and discrimination from the release of sensitive information. Different governmental units and jurisdictions attempt to balance privacy, personal and public health, research, professionalism, free speech, and even national security by regulating different aspects of health data collection, use, and privacy.

Overarching national protection is governed by the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, widely thought to protect patients’ health data collected in routine delivery of clinical care. The HIPAA Privacy Rule derives from the same Fair Information Practices (FIPs) as inform the EU Data Protection Directive. Both rely on de-identification for privacy protection. HIPAA governs what is involved in de-identification, reuse, and consent or authorization of personal health information (PHI), and what responsibilities are required of different organizations and agencies. According to the Department of Health and Human Services, the law is intended to protect individuals’ health information while providing for sharing that
information to ensure quality care and for public health. Congress extended HIPAA through a Privacy Rule, effected in 2001, that placed limitations on the sale of medical information to third parties for marketing purposes. In ways that seem relevant to the Sorrell case, the Privacy Rule reflected concerns about marketing directed at encouraging patients to purchase or use a healthcare-related product or service.

However, HIPAA does not apply to the Sorrell case for three reasons. First, the Privacy Rule applies only to “covered entities,” their “business associates,” and, since the changes mandated by the 2009 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act (part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)), business associates’ sub-contractors, but not to other types of private businesses and public agencies. New and emerging organizations and actors are not enumerated in HIPAA, so not governed by HIPAA requirements. Only covered entities and their business associates “must obtain the individual's authorization to use or disclose PHI to create or make the marketing communication.” Doctors, for example, are not permitted to provide patient lists to pharmaceutical companies for those companies' drug promotions. However, contracts often allow disclosure of personal health information, such as agreements patients click through when paying for medication, or waivers they sign to allow their physicians to provide personal health information to their insurer. A 2007 study estimated that employers, insurers, the criminal justice system, and other parties obtain some 25 million authorizations for patient records as a condition of employment, insurance, or public benefits. Usually the entire record is sent, leading to proposals to limit disclosure.
Secondly, although de-identifying data (stripping data of HIPAA-specified identifying information) is a key part of HIPAA protection, individual authorization is not required to release de-identified patient data. Patient data in question in Sorrell was HIPAA de-identified. Lastly, the case involved selling provider-identifiable prescription data, and clinicians’ privacy is not protected by HIPAA, only patients’ is. Thus, data aggregators selling patient de-identified prescription data is compliant with HIPAA. For these reasons and others discussed below, the Sorrell case highlights the need to examine health data privacy protections in light of the limitations of laws like HIPAA.

**Ethical Issues**

Legally, analyzing Sorrell involves considering whether marketing based on aggregated prescription data is protected as speech. In the US, it is. However, as evident in the discussion begun with Source, other concerns are involved. There are interwoven ethical issues related to (a) how well it is possible to de-identify health data and protect privacy, (b) selling health care data, (c) combining public and private data, (d) clinician privacy, duty of confidentiality, and professionalism, (e) public health and health care costs, and (f) transparency, accountability, and consent.

What follows is an ethical analysis of these and related considerations. Discussion picks up from the privacy issues of Source to issues particular to prescription data and then flows to more general issues of health data privacy.

**Ethical Issues - Drug Detailing**

The Vermont statute cited effects of pharmaceutical marketing to physicians, called “detailing,” on clinical decision making and professionalism, and the extent to which prescription-writing is influenced by marketing practices. Source, too, concerned selling data for detailing. Pharmaceutical detailing, it has been argued, raises significant
public policy issues. Detailing can affect prescribing practices in potentially negative ways. Concerns include detailing's effects on safety, quality, efficacy, and cost. Some argue that pharmaceutical detailing is fundamentally wrong and exploitative of professional relationships. However, fault can lie on both sides: uninformed prescribing based primarily on marketing violates professional standards, and inappropriately influencing prescribers also is not ethical even if legal.

Costs of detailing can include the costs of prescribing more expensive alternatives than other options, the substantial costs of detailing itself, the costs of impaired care from not prescribing the most appropriate treatment, drug price increases presumed to result from aggressive marketing, and higher insurance premiums and prescription co-payments for more expensive drugs. Detailing also can increase prescribing costs by influencing hospital formularies to include brand-name medications. The amount spent on detailing essentially doubled from 1996 to 2004, steadily increasing each year (though dipping in 2005).

Detailing positively affects drug prices, as does other forms of advertising. Those paying for drugs have an interest in reducing drug prices, though there are less heavy-handed ways to influence pricing than through such restrictions on detailing as Vermont’s. Whether the money spent on this form of advertising could be better spent—the pharmaceutical industry spends about twice as much on marketing drugs to physicians (which includes detailing) as it does on research—is a business decision, not one that should be legislated.

Seeing prescribers as uninformed and vulnerable in the face of pharmaceutical detailing seemed to be a factor in the Vermont legislation intended to provide them
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protection. While some physicians find detailers intrusive, others welcome them and the information they bring. In 2005, the average US primary care physician interacted with detailers twenty-eight times each week, thinking it saves time and better suits busy schedules than alternatives for learning about drugs. Even though studies show they may be unduly influenced by detailers in ways they do not recognize, physicians also understand the potential conflict of interest between marketing and patient care. Enshrining in law negative views of prescribers as unable to make decisions about detailing or to resist sales pressure fundamentally wrongs them. There are other means to counteract possible harms of directed detailing.

Ethical Issues - Required Disclosure

Issues of data disclosure are complicated when collecting data is required by law. Patients must provide personal information for treatment and medication. By law, many medications are available only with a prescription. By law, both prescribers and patients must be identified on prescriptions. By law, pharmacists dispense drugs, pharmacies are licensed, and they must collect and maintain prescription information along with the information of what medication was prescribed. The nature of a prescription itself can reveal private information about a patient’s condition and a clinician’s prescribing practices. When all this information was on paper, it was immensely difficult to collect data from different pharmacies to aggregate, process, and sell. Now it is easy and profitable, made easier because providing this data is a requirement for getting needed medications. Patients have little choice, except perhaps in choice of pharmacy, if they can find one that does not sell their data.

Data aggregators provide valuable service and should be compensated for the value added by collecting, cleaning, and aggregating data, but the sources deserve some
benefit as well. Currently, they may bear the primary costs. When data exists because it is required by law, questions arise of private benefit from a public mandate. Thus, marketing interests benefit from legal requirements of required data collection, while those required to provide and collect the information do not.

**Ethical Issues - Identifiable Data**

It is unclear whether data aggregators receive patient-identifiable data. Pharmacy data sold to data miners generally identifies pharmacy, provider, and patient (including birth date and gender); name, dosage, and quantity of the prescribed drug; and the date the prescription was filled. Before removing identifying patient data, data aggregators add a so-called "fifth P" linking code to uniquely identify individuals each time they appear in the aggregator's database. The patient is de-identified, but longitudinal prescription data about that patient can be connected to the 4Ps: product, prescriber, payer, and pharmacy. This unique patient ID enables patient tracking over time and, some have argued, could be used to link this data with data in public records (including hospital discharge databases) and commercial databases to re-identify patients, especially in sparsely populated areas.

There also are concerns over combining data from private and government sources. In one telling example of this public-private connection, the Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board and TPG Capital purchased IMS Health in 2010. Another example involves Ontario's Diabetes Registry, operated by the government agency eHealth Ontario, which continually identifies patients newly diagnosed with diabetes and captures data such as laboratory values from existing databases. It is unclear whether this data for about one million identifiable Ontarians can be sold. Even though the Canadian Medical Association's Principles for the Protection of Patients' Personal Health Information of
2011 stipulates: “Patients should be informed that the treating physician cannot control access and guarantee confidentiality for an electronic health record,” there has been little attention to protecting the privacy of personal health information kept electronically.67

**Ethical Issues - Clinician Privacy**

Clinicians’ credentials and contact information are publicly available, but details about their practices and prescribing habits are not. Physicians are the archetype clinician; though clinicians other than physicians may prescribe, the focus has been on physicians, even though the same considerations would apply to all prescribers.

Vermont contended that few physicians knew their prescription data was being sold.68 Data aggregators combine prescription data with the American Medical Association's (AMA) Physician Master File. Few US physicians may know of the AMA opt-out program (about 3% of prescribing physicians participate, according to a 2011 publication) for selling data, including the 80% of physicians who are not AMA members but whose data is sold nonetheless.69 As of 2011, about 28,000 of the 650,000 practicing physicians opted out of the AMA’s Physician Data Restriction Program (PDRP), launched in 2006 in response to a 2004 AMA survey showing that physicians thought intrusive drug detailing would be curtailed if their prescribing data were withheld.70 The PDRP does not cover non-physician prescribers, nor does it prevent data mining by pharmaceutical company employees other than sales representatives.71 Further, data mining companies may still collect and sell prescription information about those who opt out, though they are prohibited from providing it to marketers for three years.72 At least in the US, it is unlikely that legal protection of clinician privacy would be effective.73 What may be done with data concerning physicians and clinicians needs more
transparency and regulatory attention, whether in a private or public health delivery system.

**Ethical Issues - Health Information Technology, Medical Devices, and Software Regulation: Speech, Regulation, and Property**

How health data, and “speech” related to health and health care, are regulated in the large US market can affect non-US markets as well, just as EU restrictions on EU health data flow and processing outside the EU affect markets in non-EU members. The *Sorrell* decision creates concerns about how health data, health-related advertising, and product safety will, and should be, regulated. It treats data as speech. At issue in *Sorrell* was whether (1) transferring information from data mining companies to pharmaceutical companies, or (2) speaking to prescribers to sell pharmaceuticals, is speech or commercial activity. Judges deciding the *Sorrell* case had varying opinions, better crafted similar laws in some states’ have been upheld, and legal scholars debate the issue, suggesting an ethical issue where societal norms have yet to coalesce.

Common assumptions underlying privacy law and public attitudes is that speech and data are different, and that an individual’s speech is different from a salesman’s or company’s promoting products. Exposing patients to potential privacy violations stemming from releasing their prescription data in the name of speech is disquieting. Selling patients’ prescription data that will be used to sell pharmaceuticals to prescribers and patients hardly is popularly understood as speech that should be protected.75

The *Sorrell* decision is one of few cases to challenge US privacy law on First Amendment grounds. In those few cases, lower courts treated communicating raw data as speech.76 Even with the unusually strong free speech protections afforded in the US by
the First Amendment, speech is not entirely free and some speech is regulated.

Governments around the world regulate health care and public health by balancing their value against individual liberties, sometimes to the detriment of individual liberty. In India, for example, public interest, welfare, and safety take precedence over individual rights, liberty, and autonomy; so privacy is judged on a case-by-case basis as an exception to the rule that permits government interference in private life.  

In the US, such regulation includes mandating behavior to protect others (e.g. quarantines; vaccinations; requiring disclosure of personal health information about, for example, sexually transmitted diseases or possible rabies transmission), and regulating advertisements (including advertising drugs and professional services) and other forms of speech. US government agencies require warnings on cigarettes, restrict liquor sales, and regulate advertising claims by pharmaceutical companies. Thus, these regulations affect both individuals and commercial entities in ways that restrict freedom.

Because of *Sorrell*, and other recent cases, the Court might be tending towards treating commercial speech as it does other speech. Although interpretations of *Sorrell* vary, health related consumer protection regulations are expected to be challenged, continuing a trend changing from the right of consumers to hear commercial information to the right of corporations to access potential customers even if potentially detrimental to health or public interest. Already invalidated are US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) restrictions on off-label marketing of drugs, graphic warnings on cigarette packages, and calorie disclosures in restaurants. Following *Sorrell*, scholars and commentators predicted challenges to regulating advertising and sale of cigarettes, alcohol, weight-loss products, nutritional supplements; and to FDA requirements that
medical devices and drugs must be proven safe and effective. With so large a US market, challenges to FDA safety registries and device regulation have world-wide ramifications for automated devices, software, electronic health records (EHRs), telehealth and mobile phone applications, embedded radio-frequency identification devices (RFID) and biometric chips, and other health information technologies.

**Ethical Issues - Health Data: Speech or Property?**

Some argue that treating data as speech facilitates knowledge creation and that data transfers enable access to information. The *Sorrell* decision rightly states that “the creating and dissemination of information are speech …. Facts are, after all, the beginning point for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and conduct human affairs.” Used rather differently than for marketing, big data analytics applied to prescription and health care data can increase knowledge of health, disease, and treatment, though selling big data could result in limiting access and resultant knowledge to those who can pay.

Access to information also relates to property protection, including intellectual property through patents and copyrights. Big data analytic procedures that include health data can be protected as intellectual property. However, intellectual property protection also can serve to prevent disclosure and transparency, rather than enhance access to information. Software system contracts, including those for electronic patient record systems, may be shielded as intellectual property. The American Medical Informatics Association considers it unethical when this protection keeps key contract provisions concerning safety and conflict of interests secret. This shielding also calls data ownership into question and certainly contravenes transparency. Law in and outside the
US does not address medical data ownership clearly; it is not clear who the owner should be, or whether personal ownership is better than the current approach.\textsuperscript{91, 92, 93} The idea of medical information as property subject to commercial practices disturbs those who think it commodifies the self and sullies ideas of personhood. Commodifying medical information also seems anathema to professional values and the special relationship between doctor and patient.\textsuperscript{94, 95} It seems even worse when patients do not know that it is occurring and when providers cannot easily use the records they generate to conduct research.

**Conclusions**

Ethical and policy analysis related to health data and informatics should take into account public expectations, and also benefits, and harms of how the data is used. Individual liberties cross-cut public and individual health issues. De-identification is becoming increasingly untenable as a means of protecting privacy when supposedly anonymized data easily can be combined with other identifying data. Conflicting interests related to privacy and to the need to exchange and mine data are complicated further in the US by protection for commercial speech, which includes commercial uses of data such as marketing based on prescription data. Although data sharing among health care providers for research purposes and for patient safety can improve quality of care, individuals concerned about the release of their data may withhold information that could benefit their care as well as skew data on which these quality improvements are based. Many patients do not know what is, or can be, done with their data, and many would not object to having their data used for research or improving care, but keeping them ignorant is not the way to address potential concerns. In the US, as elsewhere, lack
of legal accountability and poor public transparency about health data uses feed privacy concerns. Secrecy also undermines the possibility of informed consent and violates widely-recognized rights of patients to know what information is being held about them and to correct and control how it may be used.

The Sorrell decision was based on US constitutional free speech protections, not on privacy grounds, and not on health-related considerations concerning the growing use of health information databases, data sharing, data aggregation, and biometric identification. It could be argued that protecting public and individual health, and privacy, is more valuable than the liberty to analyze data in the service of marketing. However, expanding “free speech” to encompass selling and using prescription data to sell pharmaceuticals to prescribers and patients seems to stretch the concept of “free speech.” Yet, as the Supreme Court decided in this case, the State deciding which speech is permitted and which data users are favored over others is detrimental to both personal freedom and the marketplace of ideas.

In the Information Age, it is popular to promote the view that information should be free. New abilities to collect, store, combine, and disseminate personal information continue to develop. Just because it is possible to compile and distribute extensive dossiers of personal data far more easily than in the past does not mean this should be done. As law evolves, some speech and some data becomes protected and some loses protection, and some is valued differently from others. But whether or not data is speech, it matters how data is used, for what purpose, and by whom. Use can be regulated, as some data uses are. If data collection is required through legal mandate or a requirement for medical treatment, it should be neither illegal nor unethical to regulate its use. For
other data, those closest to providing and generating it should know, and agree to, its use, and, in some way, benefit or be compensated for it. Societal norms for how to achieve this will vary over time and place.

Ethical considerations over data use will, and should, evolve as cases like *Source* and *Sorrell* encourage debate over propriety and values related to different kinds of data use and data users. The legal decisions are problematic on a variety of grounds. Appropriate uses by appropriate users should be justifiable on better grounds than the speech arguments in cases like *Sorrell*. The issues involved provide an occasion to assess the scope of existing health information privacy protection and consider how it should be governed, taking into account both the uses and users of the information. Some uses are more beneficial than others.  

Governments that have or are considering laws to regulate prescription and other health data sales and use need to grapple with these ethical issues, tensions between privacy and other considerations, and shifting norms. Much legal writing in this area relates to critiques of disclosing personal information, yet there are good reasons for some disclosure. Rigid rules can prevent good policy and wise legal decisions that take account of the kind of data, the uses to which it is put, the balancing of values involved, public opinion, and broad ramifications for public welfare. There is opportunity for new law that protects health, privacy, and other values while meeting ethical norms and allowing for future developments. Rigid rule-based requirements also can reduce ethical behavior as compliance is seen as ethically sufficient, a ceiling rather than a floor for proper behavior.  

Though what is legal and what is ethical are not necessarily the same, they can be brought closer together. Through most of history, health privacy was a matter
of the Hippocratic Oath and common law tort system that allowed for interpretation on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{101} Even though privacy tort law is not very protective of medical information,\textsuperscript{102} that flexibility in thinking may lead to more ethical practices than rigid regulations and legal maneuvering around them.

In light of new technologies and biometric and genomic identification, there is a growing need for research to protect privacy both technologically and legally so as to balance values inherent in free speech and personal freedoms, health care, commerce, and privacy–issues illuminated by the \textit{Source} and \textit{Sorrell} cases. The numerous cross-cutting issues suggest that other areas of law, ethics, and social policy also can inform the related ethical and legal considerations. Informaticians, too, can add to the conversation. They have been considering issues such as appropriate secondary use of data; patient and clinician relationships in light of the growth of electronic health records, e- and mobile health, and health information exchanges for some time. Laudably, informatics research is on-going to provide technological ways to protect privacy while achieving health care and social benefits of electronically collecting and analyzing health-related data.\textsuperscript{103} Combining legal and ethics scholarship with informaticians' expertise concerning judicious and ethical data collection and their technical knowledge of data aggregation and identification can contribute to more informed policies.

New developments require revisiting policies. As the \textit{Sorrell} Court noted:

The capacity of technology to find and publish personal information, including records required by the government, presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.\textsuperscript{104}
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Notes


6 Kaplan B. How Should Health Data Be Used? Using Source and Sorrell v. IMS, Inc to Think With about Privacy, Secondary Use, and Big Data Sales. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics in review.


11 See n. 8, Beyleveld, Histed 2000.


13 See n. 9, Dunkel 2001.

14 See n. 9, Dunkel 2001.

15 See n. 1, Sorrell v. IMS 2011, p. 2653.


19 See n. 1, Sorrell v. IMS 2011, p. 2653.


23 See n. 21, Bhagwat 2012.


26 See n. 8, Beyleveld, Histed 2000.

27 See n. 12, Taylor, 2011.


31 See n. 29, Ohm 2010.


34 See n. 12, Taylor 2011, p. 303.

35 See n. 29, Ohm 2010.


39 See n. 9, Dunkel 2001, p. 44

40 See n. 7, Kaplan forthcoming.

41 See n. 29, Ohm 2010.


44 See n. 42, Koontz 2013.


54 See n. 49, Findlay 2001.

55 See n. 51, Orentlicker 2010.


61 See n. 56, Gooch, Rohack, Finley 2013.

62 See n. 8, Beyleveld, Histed 2000.


64 See n. 52, Curfman, Morrissey, Drazen 2011.

65 Joint Appendix, Volume 1 at 155, William H. Sorrell et al. v. IMS Health Inc. et al., 2010 U.S. Briefs 779 (2nd Cir. 2011) (No. 10-779).


69 See n. 52, Curfman, Morrissey, Drazen 2011.

70 See n. 56, Gooch, Rohack, Finley 2013.
See n. 5, Petersen, DeMuro, Goodman, Kaplan 2013.

See n. 68, CMAJ 2011.

See n. 56, Gooch, Rohack, Finley 2013.

See n. 51, Orentlicker 2010


See n. 20, Bambauer 2014.

See n. 10, Srinivas, Biswas 2012.

See n. 17, Outterson 2011.

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See n. 81, Tien 2011.

See n. 16, Mello, Messing 2010.

See n. 17, Outterson 2011.

See n. 75, Piety 2012.

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See n. 6, Kaplan in review.

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See n. 63, Atherley 2011.

Hall MA, Schulman KA. Ownership of Medical Information. *JAMA* 2009;301(12):1282-4.


See n. 75, Piety 2012.


See n. 20, Bambauer 2014.


See n. 30, Malin, El Emam, O'Keefe 2013